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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of currency and banking in the German financial crisis of 1931 
for both Germany and the U.S. We specify a structural dynamic factor model to identify 
financial and monetary factors separately for each of the two economies. We find that 
monetary transmission through the Gold Standard played only a minor role in causing and 
propagating the crisis, while financial distress was important. We also find evidence of crisis 
propagation from Germany to the U.S. via the banking channel. Banking distress in both 
economies was apparently not endogenous to monetary policy. Results confirm Bernanke's 
(1983) conjecture that an independent, non-monetary financial channel of crisis propagation 
was operative in the Great Depression.  
 
Keywords:  Great Depression, 1931 financial crisis, international business cycle transmission, 
Bayesian factor analysis, currency, banking 
JEL Classifications:  N12, N13, E37, E47, C53 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Macro Programme. The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This research was funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under Collaborative 
Research Project SFB 649. We are grateful to Pooyan Amir Ahmadi, Katrin Assenmacher, 
Michael Bordo, Michael Burda, Barry Eichengreen, Harold James, Patrick van Horn, Ayhan 
Kose, Bartosz Mackowiak, Emanuel Moench, Wolfgang Reichmuth, Gary Richardson, Isabel 
Schnabel and Tobias Straumann for helpful comments. Samad Sarferaz acknowledges 
financial support by the European Science Foundation via the Globalizing Europe Economic 
History Network and the Marie Curie Research Training Networks, and thanks the University 
of Zurich and the European University Institute in Florence for their hospitality.  
 Albrecht Ritschl is an Associate of the Macro Programme at the Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics. Samad Sarferaz is a Research Associate at the 
University of Zurich. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics. 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of 
the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it 
is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent 
to the editor at the above address. 
 
© A. Ritschl and S. Sarferaz, submitted 2010 
1 Introduction
Between 1929 and 1932, national output in the U.S. and Germany declined in unison,
earlier and more strongly than in most other industrialized nations (see the data in Barro
and Ursu´a, 2008). The two economies were heavily exposed to each other, both through
financial markets and the Gold Standard. German commercial debt owed directly and
indirectly to the U.S. exceeded 10% of U.S. GDP in 1931. German reparations, owed
indirectly to the U.S. through inter-allied loans from WW1 for which they served as
collateral, again exceeded 10% of U.S. 1931 GDP. Both classes of debt were lost almost
entirely between 1931 and 1933 (Schuker, 1988). The trigger event for this was the Austro-
German financial crisis of July 1931. In a matter of days, it led to the nationalization
of Germany’s five largest banks, the suspension of gold convertibility, the introduction
of capital controls, and a moratorium on reparations (see James, 1986, for an account of
events).
Schnabel (2004) highlighted the vulnerability of German banks as a main cause of the
1931 crisis, identifying lack of equity and high exposure to short-term foreign credit as key
factors. The weak position of Germany’s banks had been inherited from the stabilization
after the hyperinflation of 1923, which was strongly based on U.S. credit.
The 1931 financial crisis was also the first major crisis of the interwar Gold Standard,
and effectively marked the beginning of its breakdown. Doubts about the credibility of
Germany’s commitment to the Gold Standard, as well as its ability to defend its currency,
were emphasized by Eichengreen (1992) and Temin (1989).
Moreover, the financial crisis of 1931 was a foreign debt and reparation crisis. Large
foreign borrowing under the favorable terms of the Dawes Plan between 1924 and 1929
had diluted the value of reparation claims. Stricter terms for reparation payments under
the Young Plan helped to dry out further lending to Germany and led to a policy of
fiscal austerity (Ritschl, 2002b). Dwindling domestic support for this policy in early 1931
triggered doubts about Germany’s willingness and ability to pay further reparations,
which contributed to the outbreak of the crisis.
Scholars have long emphasized the fact that both Germany’s financial system and its
foreign public debt were mainly underwritten by the U.S., see Kindleberger (1973) and
in particular, Schuker (1988). This would make spillover effects of Germany’s crisis on
the U.S. seem plausible. Following Friedman and Schwartz (1963), historians have seen
the financial crises of 1931 as one link in a chain of events that helped to turn the U.S.
recession after 1929 into a catastrophic recession (see Temin, 1989). Bernanke (1983)
argued that these financial crises operated as an independent, non-monetary channel of
crisis transmission and propagation during the Great Depression.
The present paper is about identifying this financial channel and assessing its impor-
tance in aggravating the Great Depression in 1931. We employ dynamic factor analysis
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(DFA) to aggregate the information in a large number of financial, monetary, and real
time series from both the U.S. and Germany. Our choice of the U.S./Germany compari-
son is motivated both by the dominant role of the U.S. as the anchor of the interwar gold
standard and the high mutual financial exposure of the U.S. and Germany. We provide
structure to the factor model by exclusion restrictions on the factor loadings. For each
country, we specify a currency component, a banking factor, and a real component sep-
arately. The first is designed to capture monetary transmission channels under the Gold
Standard, which would be in line with more traditional interpretations of the 1931 crisis
as first- or second-generation currency crisis (as in Eichengreen, 1992 or Temin, 2008).
The banking component is designed to a measure of financial distress, reflecting views of
the German 1931 crisis as a banking crisis by Schumpeter (1939), Born (1967) and James
(1986), or more recently, as a third generation twin crisis (see Kaminsky and Reinhart,
1998, and the ensuing literature) by Schnabel (2004) and Adalet (2005).
The presence of identified common components in both countries allows us to examine
their dynamic relationships both domestically and internationally. We do this obtaining
impulse response functions from the factors under weak identifying restrictions. We also
assess the information content of the individual factors by measuring their contribution to
the forecasting power of the dynamic factor model. We do this at several critical junctures
before and during the crisis, trying to obtain a pattern causality and propagation.
The idea that transmission of the 1931 financial crisis to the U.S. was important
was emphasized by James (2001, 2009). Coincident with the German banking crisis,
Richardson and van Horn (2008) find a strong increase in financial distress at New York
banks. Accominotti (2009) examined bank balance sheets from London and found that
the German banking crisis was instrumental in weakening the Sterling and pushing Britain
off the Gold Standard. Moure´ (2002) argued that after the end of Germany’s reparations
in August 1932, France’s default on her portion of the inter-allied debt in 1932, along
with her gold withdrawals, seriously worsened the credit crunch in the U.S. (see also
Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2008).
Our results indicate that both monetary and financial transmission mechanisms were
active during the slump. However, financial factors constitute by far the dominant channel
of internaitonal crisis propagation, while monetary forces played only a moderate role
(using a DSGE model Cole, Ohanian, and Leung, 2005, obtain related results). This also
holds domestically for both economies, which is consistent with evidence from a FAVAR
model for the U.S. in Amir Ahmadi and Ritschl (2009). We also find that contrary
to expectation, crisis transmission from the U.S. to Germany was comparatively minor.
In contrast, we obtain evidence of marked feedback effects from Germany on the U.S.,
transmitted mainly through the financial stress components.
These feedback effects became pronounced around the German crisis of July 1931. We
find strong predictive power of Germany’s financial factor for the U.S. economy, indicating
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a strong systemic component of the July 1931 crisis. We also find evidence that shock
transmission to the U.S. after the crisis is stronger than before.
Our results relate closely to research in recent years about foreign debt crises and
their international spillovers. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996) have identified large
output effects of such crises in the defaulting countries as well as marked spillover effects.
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006) have argued that the U.S. depression of 1929 to 1933
and the subsequent recovery to 1937 bear a lot of resemblance to foreign-debt-related
recessions. With due caution, our results on the transatlantic spillover of Germany’s
financial crisis can be viewed as complementary to and consistent with this interpretation.
To analyze the issue econometrically, we chose an approach that allows for sufficiently
rich dynamics while capturing information from a large number of time series. Vector
autoregression (VAR) analysis alone would not be the adequate tool because of its lim-
itation to hardly more than a few time series. To exploit the information imbedded in
many disaggregate time series and avoid the curse of dimensionality, we rely on a dy-
namic version of factor analysis as e.g. in Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin (2000) or
Stock and Watson (2002a,b). As indicated above, we combine the dynamic factor model
with vector autoregressions to analyze the interdependencies between the estimated la-
tent factors, following the factor augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) approach by
Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005). Our version of the FAVAR model identifies the
factors by exclusion restrictions, thus giving them a structural interpretation (as in Kose,
Otrok, and Whiteman, 2003). However, we do not attempt to identify monetary policy
instruments, as the focus of our interest is less on policy impulses but rather on the
channels of transmission themselves.
Our approach to the dynamic factor models is a Bayesian one. We employ Monte Carlo
Markov chain (MCMC) techniques to infer the posterior distributions. Our choice of a
Bayesian framework is motivated by pragmatic considerations regarding computational
convenience, following the lead of Otrok and Whiteman (1998) and Kim and Nelson
(1998). As is implicit in the MCMC methodology, our estimates are quite robust to
changes in the prior; hence our choice of the Bayesian framework can be regarded as a
matter of computational convenience. The Bayesian approach also suggests itself from
our choice of a structural factor model, as Bayesian numerical techniques are particularly
robust in the presence of identifying exclusions restrictions.
Business cycle transmission with recent international data has been analyzed by struc-
tural VARs e.g. in Stock and Watson (2005) and by dynamic factor models in Eickmeier
(2007). To our knowledge, the present paper is the first study applying modern time se-
ries methodology to the international transmission of the interwar Great Depression. Due
to the limitations that existed so far in extending VARs to panel data, existing econo-
metric work on the international Great Depression, as in Bernanke and James (1991) and
Bernanke and Carey (1996), was confined to cross section methods.
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We structure the evidence by grouping the national time series into nominal and real
series and extracting identified factors specific to these groups under exclusion restrictions.
We find that the real factors we construct from the data coincide well with traditional
business cycle dating schemes and historical national accounts for the respective countries.
This is well in line with the results of Stock and Watson (1998) on a factor approach
towards business cycle dating. We group the nominal series further by subdividing them
into general monetary indicators on the one hand and bank specific indicators on the
other. The factors we extract from these series again seem to replicate the historical
evidence well.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section characterizes the
dynamic factor model we employ. Section 3 provides the data. Section 4 obtains the
factors and evaluates the relative importance of currency and banking in the German
crisis. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Structural DFA Model
The dynamic factor approach is to to assemble more information than could be processed
by a standard VAR analysis, the workhorse model of empirical macroeconomic analysis.
We follow recent developments in dynamic factor analysis that have augmented VARs
with information gathered from a large cross section of time series. The idea is to aggre-
gate the common components of large time series panels into synthetic series or factors,
which are then used as inputs into a standard VAR. For each of the two economies in
our dataset, we restrict the factor loadings to specific subsets of the series, monetary,
financial, and real.
The data panel Yt , spanning a cross section of N series and an observation period of
length T , is described by the following equation:
Yt = C + Λft + Ut (1)
where ft is a K × 1 vector containing the latent factors, Ut is a N × 1 vector of variable-
specific idiosyncratic components, C is an N × 1 vector of constant terms and Λ is the
N ×K coefficient matrix linking the K common factors to the i-th variable. More pre-
cisely, the Λ matrix controls for the structural interpretation of the factors, where each
factor can be loaded on a subset of the data by imposing zero restrictions. In this context,
we define
Λ =
[
ΛUS 0
0 ΛD
]
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where
ΛUS =
 Λ
real 0 0
0 Λmonetary 0
0 0 Λfinancial

and
ΛD =
 Λ
real 0 0
0 Λmonetary 0
0 0 Λfinancial

The law of motion for the factors, which is in VAR form, is defined as:
ft = φ1ft−1 + · · ·+ φqft−q + vt, (2)
with vt ∼ N (0,Σ). The idiosyncratic components Ut are assumed to follow an AR(p)
process:
Ut = Θ1Ut−1 + . . .+ ΘpUt−p + χt (3)
where Θ1, . . . ,Θp are N ×N diagonal matrices and χt ∼ N (0N×1,Ωχ) with
Ωχ =

σ21,χ 0 · · ·
0 σ22,χ
...
... · · · . . .
0 · · · 0
0
...
0
σ2N,χ

To ease the computational burden we quasi difference equation (1). Accordingly we
multiply equation (1) by (I −Θ(L)), where Θ(L) = Θ1 + · · ·+ Θp and I is the identity
matrix, which leads to the following expression:
Y ∗t = C
∗ + Λ∗ft + χt, (4)
where Y ∗t = (I −Θ(L))Yt, Λ∗ = (I −Θ(L))Λ and C∗ = (I −Θ(L))C .
Prior Specification
For the AR-Parameters of the idiosyncratic components Θ1,Θ2, . . . ,Θp we specified the
following prior:
θprior ∼ N (θ, V θ)
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where θ = 0p×1 and where
[
V θ
]
= τ1

1 0 · · ·
0 1
2
...
... · · · . . .
0 · · · 0
0
...
0
1
p

We choose τ1 = 0.2. The shrinkage prior we specified implies that we punish more distant
lags. This is applied by subsequently decreasing the uncertainty about the mean prior
belief that the parameters are zero for increasing lag values.
For each of the factor loadings we specified the following prior:
λprior ∼ N (λ, V λ)
where λ = 0 and V λ = 100. For each of the variances of the disturbances in χt we
specified the following prior:
σpriorχ ∼ IG
(
αχ
2
,
δχ
2
)
where we choose αχ = 6 and δχ = 0.001, which implies a fairly loose prior. IG denotes
the inverted gamma distribution.
For the parameters of the VAR equation (2) we follow Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz
(2005) and impose the Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) Minnesota-type prior on the VAR
parameters. Then, the prior distribution of the covariance matrix Σ and the VAR pa-
rameters Φ can be expressed by:
Σprior ∼ IW(Σ, K + 2),
with IW representing the inverse Wishart distribution and
vec(Φprior) ∼ N (0,Σprior ⊗G),
where G imposes less weight on more distant lags .
2.1 Estimation
Estimation of the model is via the Gibbs sampler. The principal idea of this algorithm is
to break the joint distribution of the model parameters into the conditional distributions
and to proceed by iterating over the conditional distributions. As a first step, we start by
drawing the parameter block Ξ = [Λ,Θ1, . . . ,Θp,Φ,ΩχΣ] and take values for the factors
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as given. In the next step we use the obtained draws and calculate the factors conditional
on the realizations of the previous block. These values of the first Gibbs Sampling step
are now used to compute the next step by iterating through the blocks just mentioned.
Iterating over sufficiently many steps, the simulated frequency distribution converges to
the joint distribution at an exponential rate.1. To ensure that the dynamic factor model
is uniquely identified, the upper K ×K block of the factor loadings matrix is set to the
identity matrix2 where each diagonal element corresponds to one of the structural factors.
3 Data
Data are at a monthly frequency from September 1925 to November 1932. The U.S. series
are taken from the NBER’s macroeconomic history database, while the German data we
take from Wagemann (1935). The U.S. data include, among others, bank debits, deposits,
discount rates, steel production, machinery prices, orders of machinery, as well as an index
of industrial production and trade. The German series are, among others, short term
deposits, wholesale and consumer price indices, currency in circulation, discount rates,
domestic orders of machinery, steel production, industrial production, and employment in
the metal trades. All data except for the interest rates were standardized and transformed
into first differences. For a more detailed description of the dataset see Appendix B.
4 Results
For the empirical results we choose the lag lengths p = 1, q = 7. We cycled through
30,000 Gibbs iterations. To avoid that our results are driven by the starting values we
discard the first 10,000 draws of the chain as burn-in. We ensured global convergence
by restarting the algorithm several times over, each time using different starting values
drawn from an overdispersed distribution. Results obtained were very similar. In each
case, the sampler reached convergence already after a few thousand draws.
4.1 Real and Nominal Factors
To add structure to the factor approach, we restrict the data space on which factors are
allowed to load. For both the U.S. and Germany, we identify three factors, one of them
real, the other two nominal. The first factor is designed to capture real activity in the
respective national economies. The two nominal factors load on a number of currency
and banking series, respectively.
1See Geman and Geman (1984) A more detailed description of the estimation procedure is provided
in Appendix A.
2This is again similar to Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005).
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(Figure 1 about here)
The real factor for the U.S. loads on output data for investment goods, as well as a
contemporary index of output in manufacturing and trade. The result is shown in Fig-
ure 1(a). This factor is essentially a reflection of traditional business cycle chronologies,
and is highly correlated with the most commonly used indices of industrial production.
We found the result to be very robust to changes in the specification of the time series
included. We also notice a very good fit with a broadly based factor of economic activity
calculated in Ritschl, Sarferaz, and Uebele (2008). Our results confirm the observation by
Stock and Watson (1998) that one-factor models describe the real state of the economy
quite well.
The monetary factor for the U.S. in Figure 1(c) loads on different short-term interest
rates. By construction, this factor closely mirrors the increase in short term interest rates
through late 1929, followed by a sharp decline to early 1931. A pronounced upward shock
becomes visible in mid-1931, right around the time of Germany’s 1931 crisis.
The U.S. banking factor in Figure 1(e) is based on the commonly used banking statis-
tics from the NBER database. It shows continuing expansion through the 1920s, and
reaches its peak with the October 1929 crash. The banking panic of December 1930 is
also visible. Again, there is an additional downward shock in mid-1931, right after the
German crisis.
Figure 1(b) shows the German factor of real activity: fast recovery from a recession
in 1925/6 is followed by a marked slowdown in 1927. Real activity peaks in the summer
of 1929, and is already in decline at the time of the New York stock market crash. A
beginning recovery in the first half of 1931 is suddenly chocked off by a strong downward
shock at the time of the German crisis. After a double dip in summer 1932, recovery set
in and was well under way before early 1933, when the Nazis got to power. All this is in
line with conventional wisdom (see Ritschl, 2002a for a discussion).
The German currency factor in Figure 1(d) is again largely composed of interest rates.
It peaks in mid-1929 and then falls rapidly to reach its trough in mid-1930. An upward
jump is visible in September 1930, after a national election that sharply increased the
Nazi and communist votes. There is some slight improvement before the German crisis of
mid-1931 and a huge shock afterwards. Interest rates came down markedly during 1932,
leveling out towards the end of 1932.
The banking factor in Figure 1(f), loading on the banking series in our dataset, is
rather similar to series generated by Schnabel (2004) and Adalet (2005). It shows almost
continuous improvement to March 1929, when a first setback occurred, coincident with
the first Young Plan crisis (see James, 1985). Recovery to early 1930 was followed by
a second setback, coincident with the adoption of the Young Plan, Schacht’s resignation
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from the Reichsbank presidency, and the downfall of the last parliamentary government.
After that, the banking factor begins a precipitous decline, which develops into a collapse
at the time of the mid-1931 crisis. There is no recovery until early 1933. Germany’s
two nominal factors thus both show a major, sudden decline in mid-1931. Eyeballing the
evidence from the factors, one may conclude that both a currency and a banking crisis
were at work.
Drawing the evidence from this section together, a common salient feature of the
factors, and thus of the common underlying dynamics of our time series, is the marked
deterioration in mid-1931, at the time of the German crisis. This effect is not limited
to the German data, and is indeed visible also in the factors we extracted from the U.S.
series. The next section will trace the phenomenon further, employing impulse-response
analysis of a structural FAVAR.
4.2 Currency vs. Banking: the Transmission of Shocks
This section relates the above factors to each other in a VAR analysis. As the factors
have a structural interpretation, the dynamic relationships between these factors can
be given a structural interpretation as well. This section analyzes the transmission of
surprise shocks across the two economies using impulse response functions. Our interest
focuses on the relative importance of monetary shocks, transmitted through the Gold
Standard mechanism, and of shocks to the banking system, transmitted through the
mutual exposure of the two countries’ banking systems to each other.
We orthogonalize the shocks using mostly the temporal Cholesky decomposition. Our
principal identification strategy is to assume that the U.S. factors do not react simultane-
ously to international conditions, while the German ones do: U.S. real activity is assumed
endogenous to U.S. monetary and banking conditions only. German currency conditions
are assumed endogenous to U.S. factors but exogenous to German banking conditions.
We furthermore assume that German real were endogenous to all other factors.
The only exception to this identification strategy is the propagation of shocks to
the U.S. interest and banking factors, for which we adopt the agnostic sign restriction
approach of Uhlig (2005). The idea is to focus only on those results that yield plausible
impulse responses for the nominal side of the economy, while being agnostic with regard
to the response of real activity in the economy. Uhlig (2005) suggested this approach as
an alternative to the recursive Cholesky identification in order to avoid sign puzzles in
the response of nominal series to a monetary shock at short horizons. Such sign puzzles
would abound in impulse responses obtained via the Cholesky decomposition from U.S.
interwar data, which makes the use of an alternative approach compelling.
To identify the responses to nominal shocks, we present results for two alternative sets
of sign restrictions. In a baseline identification, we restrict the responses of both the U.S.
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monetary and the U.S. banking factor to a nominal shock to be negative for six months.
No sign restriction operates on the responses of real activity in both countries to a nominal
shock. We also experiment with a departure from Uhlig’s (2005) agnostic approach toward
the response of real activity and employ a stronger identification, restricting the response
of U.S. output to be negative as well.
To account for the potential effects of the German crisis of July 1931, we also run
the FAVAR analysis of this section separately for a truncated observation period from
1925 to May 1931, cutting off just before the onset of the financial crisis. Comparison
of the impulse response functions from the full and truncated sample allows us to draw
additional conclusions about the possible impact of the 1931 crisis.
4.2.1 Full Observation Period
Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions and the error bands for adverse shocks to
U.S. real activity. Such shocks tended to be quite persistent. They were transmitted to
the U.S. monetary factor, which exhibits a marked downward response of interest rates.
Strong adverse effects on U.S. banking conditions existed as well. On average, around
40% of the forecast error variance in the U.S. banking factor is explained by real shocks,
albeit with substantial error margins. The German economy shows similar responses to
real shocks on U.S. economy, albeit in weakened form.
(Figures 2 and 3 about here)
To identify the effects of nominal shocks to the U.S. economy, we proceed in two steps.
Figure 4 shows the responses to an adverse nominal shock, were the responses of both the
monetary and the banking factors for the U.S. are restricted to be negative for six months.
Under this baseline, the responses of Germany’s nominal factors over the same horizon
are negative as well. This seems like a desirable property: an identified nominal shock to
the U.S. operates like a global nominal shock, the two are observationally equivalent.
The real factor in both economies also respond in almost identical fashion, however
with less desirable properties. The median response of U.S. real activity over a six-month
horizon is just negative, indicating that almost 50% of the draws are positive. The re-
sponse of German real activity to a nominal shock is equally diffuse, again with almost
half of the probability mass in the positive orthant. For both countries, the forecast error
variance in real activity explained by the nominal shock is minimal, averaging less than
10%, see Figure 5.
(Figures 4 and 5 about here)
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To achieve sharper results for the real responses to nominal shocks, we depart for a
moment from Uhlig’s (2005) agnostic stance on output responses and force the response
of U.S. real activity to be negative for six months after a nominal shock. This additional
constraint allows us to identify shocks to monetary conditions and to the banking factor
separately.
Figure 6 shows the responses to tightening conditions in the U.S. money market (al-
though not necessarily to monetary policy itself). By construction, the response of U.S.
real activity is now negative for six months. This sign restriction is a binding constraint.
In its absence, the response of the U.S. real factor to a monetary shock would have been
positive throughout. On average, U.S. banking responds negatively for most horizons,
although large parts of the probability mass indicate positive responses. As suspected
by Bernanke (1983), monetary factors have only limited explanatory power for financial
conditions: hardly more than 10% of the forecast error variation in the U.S. banking
factor are explained by the U.S. interest factor. This result was very robust under a
variety of different specifications of both the monetary and the ban king factors. The
sign restriction on the monetary factor itself is again binding: as soon as the constraint
is lifted, the response turns into negative territory. The responses of the German factors
are similar to their U.S. counterparts but on the whole appear more diffuse.
(Figures 6 and 8 about here)
(Figures 7 and 9 about here)
The forecast error decompositions in Figure 7 suggest a share of 10-20% for nominal
tightening in explaining the variance of U.S. real activity. This appears to confirm re-
sults of Sims (1999) in a longitudinal study of U.S. monetary policy in the 20th century,
as well as of Amir Ahmadi and Ritschl (2009) from a FAVAR model for U.S. monetary
policy during the Great Depression.
Figure 8 shows the responses to tightening financial conditions. Again obtained un-
der sign restrictions, the shocks are quite persistent and also translate into persistent
real effects. However, the response of real activity in the U.S. is negative for the first
six months by construction. After that, it remains negative on average, but draws with
positive responses do occur, indicating that the restriction is binding. Lifting the con-
straint, the responses would be positive throughout. As before, the German responses
are structurally similar but more diffuse.
The forecast error decompositions in Figure 9 suggest that about 15 % of the varia-
tion in the real factor can be explained by shocks to financial conditions, which is slightly
higher than for monetary shocks.
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(Figures 10 and 12 about here)
(Figures 11 and 13 about here)
Next we look at the effects of shocks to the German factors. As would be expected,
a shock to real activity in Germany (see Figure 10) is persistent domestically but has
no discernible effect on the U.S. economy. Shocks to German money market conditions,
shown in Figure 12, propagate through the German economy without sign puzzles and
have real effects. However, their contribution to the forecast error variance of the German
real factor is low (see Figure 13).
Monetary market tightening in Germany has near-significant effects on real conditions
in the U.S., yet their contribution to forecast error variance is negligible (see Figure
13). The effect of nominal tightening in Germany on U.S. monetary conditions is briefly
negative and significant but then turns into positive, however without being significant.
There is also a negative but insignificant effect on the U.S. banking environment. Both
effects would be consistent with the classical gold standard mechanism, however in a
slightly non-standard way: it almost looks as if the U.S. played the role of a monetary
shock absorber for the international gold standard, much like the Bank of England in the
pre-World War I years.
The same direction of causality becomes visible for adverse shocks to the German
banking factor. Figure 14 shows persistent and significant effects on U.S. real activity as
well as on U.S. banking conditions, while the effect on the U.S. interest factor is hump-
shaped and changes signs. This effect of German banking conditions on U.S. conditions
has hardly been studied so far; we found it to be robust under a large variety of alter-
native specifications. A look at the variance decompositions in Figure 15 shows a high
contribution of Germany’s banking factors to the forecast error variance of the German
real factor. With a delay of about ten months, marked effects also build up on the vari-
ance of the U.S. real and banking factors.
(Figures 14 and 15 about here)
This result would lend support to the hypothesis of James (2001) that the deepening
of the U.S. recession in 1931 was at least partly triggered by the international repercus-
sions of the 1931 crisis in Austria and Germany. The variance decompositions in Figure
15 show that after two years, the cumulative effects of shocks to Germany’s banking
conditions on the U.S. real factor are markedly higher than for the U.S. monetary and
banking factors in Fig. 6 and 8 above.
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4.2.2 Truncated Observation Period, 1925 to June 1931
To identify the contribution of the 1931 crisis to this surprising result, we truncate the
observation period to end in May 1931. Figure 16 shows the responses to German cur-
rency shocks for this subperiod. A surprising countercyclical pattern emerges: adverse
monetary shocks in Germany have mostly adverse effects on German real activity in
banking, but significant, favorable effects on real conditions in the U.S. In contrast, in
this truncated sample from before the crisis, all responses to an adverse shock to German
banking (in Figure 18) have roughly the same characteristics as for the whole sample (in
Figure 14) but are less significant and have less explanatory power for forecast error vari-
ance. Evidently, the German crisis of 1931 sharpens the results. The financial accelerator
effects of Germany’s 1931 crisis on the U.S. economy must have been considerable.
(Figures 16 and 17 about here)
(Figures 18 and 19 about here)
Drawing the results of this section together, our application of a dynamic factor model
finds little evidence for the traditional view that U.S. monetary or banking problems were
key in explaining the depression in either country. We find only scant support for a trans-
mission of the recession from the U.S. to Germany through either monetary of financial
channels of transmission. We also notice that nominal shocks to the U.S. economy do
not play a dominant role in explaining the variation of real activity.
Conversely, we do find significant effects of Germany’s nominal shocks on real activ-
ity in the U.S. economy. Again the monetary channel is of relatively minor importance.
Transmission through the banking channel, however, comes out as quantitatively impor-
tant and highly persistent. The effects have not fully built up after 20 months, and would
explain 30% in the variance of both U.S. real activity and the U.S. banking factor.
However, most of these effects did apparently not really materialize before the 1931
crisis. Truncating the observation period to end in May 1931, we find the responses to
Germany’s nominal conditions to be less pronounced and less significant.3 This implies
that transmission from Germany to the U.S. is strongest in the period after July 1931. We
conclude that international spillovers from the German crisis of 1931 were a significant
force in deepening the U.S. recession.
We also find that while nominal factors seem to have played a rather minor role in
the U.S. recession, the overall role of nominal factors in the German recession seems
somewhat stronger. Responses of German real activity to adverse shocks in German
monetary and banking conditions are estimated precisely and without having to resort to
sign restrictions. In the case of financial shocks, they are also quantitatively important,
3The more direct test of obtaining the results for the subperiod from June 1931 to March 1933 would
not be feasible due to missing degrees of freedom in specifying the model
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accounting for a third of the forecast error variance in German real activity. Again, the
explanatory power of monetary shocks is much lower: the explained variation in German
real activity is only about 10%.
The results so far imply that banking conditions played a dominant role in the German
crisis of 1931. As a corollary, if there was a financial frictions channel of transatlantic
business cycle transmission in the Great Depression, it originated in Germany rather
than in the U.S., and affected both economies significantly. This is consistent with the
claim by Harold James (2001) that the German banking crisis had major spillover effects
on the international economy. It is also consistent with the claim of James (1986) and
Schnabel (2004) that Germany’s 1931 crisis was causally a banking crisis, while monetary
transmission under the Gold Standard played only a secondary role.
4.3 Currency vs. Banking: the Systematic Effects
Thus far, attention has focused on the transmission of surprise shocks. In the following
section, we examine possible systematic effects that may have been factored into expec-
tations. Systematic components included in the agents’ information set at time t would
be reflected in the accuracy of forecasts made on the basis of that information set. In
this section we obtain forecasts of real activity in Germany and the U.S., conditional
on the information at critical junctures before and during the 1931 crisis. To evaluate
the information content of the banking factor at any of these points in time, we obtain
each forecast twice, once from a bivariate VAR including the banking sector, once from
a univariate AR of the same lag length in the real activity factor alone.
4.3.1 Germany
Univariate forecasts for the German real factor from March and May 1931 predict re-
covery, extrapolating from the green shoots that had become visible in early 1931. The
forecasts are quite imprecise, though, with widely diverging error bands. Only if the up-
date from July 1931, after the crisis, is incorporated does the univariate forecast predict
a further downturn.
(Figure 20 about here)
To evaluate the gain in forecasting power from the information content in the bank-
ing factor, we now add the German Banking series and perform bivariate conditional
forecasts for the same three truncated samples.
(Figure 21 about here)
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The forecast of the German real sector from March 1931 already predicts further down-
turn, although large parts of the probability mass are still predicting a further increase.
The forecast for May 1931 is much more unequivocal about a further decrease. Com-
paring this forecast to the univariate forecast for May in Figure 20 above, the banking
series turns out to be highly informative about a renewed downturn. German banking
variables up to May 1931 clearly predict a major deterioration before the July 1931 crisis.
If the update to the banking series for July is included, we obtain a full prediction of the
decline in real activity through mid-1931 (in Figure 21(c)).
No comparable gain in predictive power is obtained if we include monetary instead of
banking variables in the forecasts. Results in Figure 22 show little improvement over the
univariate forecast of real activity in Figure 20 above.
(Figure 22 about here)
Only if the information from July 1931 is incorporated does the bivariate forecast in-
cluding monetary information predict the further decline in activity correctly.
These results confirm the evidence from the impulse response analysis in the previous
section: the domestic driving force behind Germany’s 1931 crisis was the weakness of
its banking system. The deterioration in banking conditions foreshadowed the July 1931
crisis, and indeed has considerably predictive power. By comparison, domestic monetary
conditions play only a secondary role.
No predictive power for German real activity is gained from including U.S. rather
than German monetary and banking data in the forecasts before the July 1931 crisis.
(Figure 24 about here)
(Figure 25 about here)
Indeed it is noteworthy how the inclusion of the U.S. monetary factor tends to but-
tress the prediction of a continuing upswing in Spring 1931. Even after the beginning of
crisis in July, the forecasts conditional on U.S. data are more optimistic than the univari-
ate forecast in Figure 20 above. According to these results, U.S. data are uninformative
about the German financial crisis; there is no indication that the 1931 crisis was triggered
by conditions in the U.S.
4.3.2 U.S.
In Figure 27 we show forecasts for the U.S. real sector as of March 1931. As can be seen,
they predict rather a stagnation than a further deterioration of the U.S. economy.
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(Figure 27 about here)
The noteworthy exception is the forecast including the monetary factor, which predicts
fast recovery. This would indicate that money market conditions were not a constraining
factor in the spring of 1931.
Figure 28 shows the forecasts from May 1931 on. The univariate forecast is now
more pessimistic, and the bivariate forecast including banking conditions is even more so.
These are clear signs of mounting banking distress in the U.S. before the July 1931 crisis.
In contrast, the forecast including monetary factors is again pointing to an imminent
recovery.
(Figure 28 about here)
The forecasts from July 1931 confirm this result. Again, the bivariate forecast including
banking activity is more pessimistic than the univariate forecast. It is also closer to the
actual trajectory of real activity after the crisis. The forecast including monetary condi-
tions once again comes out as more optimistic, signaling an end to the recession and a
return to recovery in 1932.
(Figure 29 about here)
Again we examine mechanisms of transatlantic business cycle transmission, this time
tracking possible anticipation and contagion effects of the German financial crisis on the
U.S. Figure 30 shows bivariate forecasts of U.S. real activity from May 1931 including
the German banking and monetary factors, respectively.
(Figure 30 about here)
The bivariate forecast of U.S. real activity using the German banking factor up until
May 1931 is as pessimistic as the forecast using the U.S. banking factor in Figure 28
above. This result implies that German banking conditions in May 1931 were informa-
tive about U.S. real activity. In contrast, the German currency factor adds no predictive
power and essentially reproduces the univariate forecast of U.S. real activity in Figure 28
above.
For July 1931, including data from immediately after the German financial crisis we
obtain a very similar result.
(Figure 31 about here)
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German banking data are again highly informative about U.S. real activity; they now
actually predict the further downturn slightly better than the bivariate forecast using the
U.S. banking factor in Figure 29 above. In contrast, using German monetary information
again fails to predict U.S. real activity and signals a swift (though short-lived) recovery.
In sum, we find that banking conditions in both the U.S. and Germany have con-
siderable predictive power for real activity in mid-1931, while monetary factors do not.
However, U.S. banking conditions have very little predictive power for German real ac-
tivity, while the German banking factor is highly informative about U.S. real activity.
This evidence would be difficult to reconcile with an interpretation of the 1931 financial
crisis as a primarily monetary phenomenon, or as contagion of distress originating in the
U.S. banking system. It is consistent, however, with the interpretation that the German
financial crisis of 1931 was primarily rooted in Germany’s national banking system and
had strong adverse effects on the U.S. economy as well.
5 Conclusion
This paper assessed the relative importance, both domestic and international, of Gold
Standard transmission vs. banking channels in the origins and the propagation of the
German financial crisis of 1931. To identify channels of crisis causation and propagation,
we employed a structural dynamic factor model of the interactions between the U.S.
and the German economy between 1925 and 1932. To this end we restricted the model
to yield structural factors representing banking and monetary conditions the U.S. and
the German separately. We also included one real factor for each of the two economies.
Our real factors appear to trace established business cycle chronologies very well. Our
nominal factors for Germany suggest that both monetary and banking conditions in
Germany deteriorated severely and persistently in the 1931 crisis.
The first main result of this paper is that the overall transmission of nominal shocks
from the U.S. to the German economy was insignificant and quantitatively negligible.
This implies only weak support for the conventional wisdom that monetary and banking
conditions in the U.S. transmitted the Great Depression to the rest of the world. In spite
of our use of a broad database, we do not detect the U.S. causation of the international
depression that has been taken for granted in much of the traditional literature. In
contrast, we find remarkably high transmission of shocks in U.S. real activity to the
German economy.
A second main result of this study is that in both countries, the influence of domestic
monetary conditions on real activity was weak. Neither surprise effects nor any systematic
effects appear to play a significant role. This result proved robust under a large variety
of different specifications we experimented with.
The third main result of this paper is that banking conditions constitute a important
17
channel of domestic propagation and international transmission of the Great Depression,
confirming the central claim of Bernanke (1983). We find that banking conditions can-
not be explained by monetary conditions but themselves have marked real effects. The
domestic financial channel comes out stronger in Germany but is also present in the U.S.
International transmission through the financial channel was from Germany to the U.S.,
from the periphery to the core. This effect comes out stronger after the 1931 crisis.
We have argued in this paper that the U.S. was strongly exposed to the German econ-
omy through credit, and indirectly through reparations that collateralized inter-Allied
war credits. Germany’s banking system suffered a meltdown in mid-1931, which made
this vulnerability visible. In the process, the U.S. lost loans to Germany and Europe
that equaled Germany’s GDP in 1931, or roughly on quarter of U.S. GDP in the same
year. The collapse of Germany’s financial position in 1931 was a key event in turning the
international recession into an unprecedented economic disaster.
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A Estimation
A.1 Estimating the Parameter Block
In this section we condition on the factors ft. Because equation (1) is set of N independent
regressions with autoregressive error terms it is possible to estimate Λ, Θ1,Θ2, . . . ,Θp,
Ωχ and Ω equation by equation.
4 We rewrite equation (3) as:
ui = Xi,uθi + χi (5)
where ui = [ui,p+1 ui,p+2 . . . ui,T ]
′ is T − p × 1, θi = [θi,1 θi,2 . . . θi,p]′, is p × 1 and
χi = [χi,p+1 χi,p+2 . . . χi,T ]
′ is T − p× 1 and
Xi,u =

ui,p ui,p−1 · · ·
ui,p+1 ui,p · · ·
...
...
...
ui,T−1 ui,T−2 · · ·
ui,1
ui,2
...
ui,T−p

which is a T − p× p for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Combining the priors described in section 2 with the likelihood function we obtain the
following posterior distributions.
The posterior of the AR-parameters of the idiosyncratic components is:
θi ∼ N(θi, V i,θ)ISθ (6)
where
θi =
(
Vθ
−1 + (σ2i,χ)
−1X ′i,uXi,u
)−1 (
V −1θ θ + (σ
2
i,χ)
−1X ′i,uui
)
and
V i,θ =
(
V −1θ + (σ
2
i,χ)
−1X ′i,uXi,u
)−1
.
where ISθ is an indicator function enforcing stationarity.
The posterior of the variance of the idiosyncratic component σi,χ is:
σi,χ ∼ IG
(
(T + αχ)
2
,
((ui −Xiθi)′(ui −Xiθi) + δχ)
2
)
(7)
To estimate the factor loadings we rewrite equation (1) as:
y∗i = c
∗
i + λif
∗ + χ (8)
4See also Chib (1993).
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where y∗i = [(1 − θ(L)i)yi,p+1 (1 − θ(L)i)yi,p+2 . . . (1 − θ(L)i)yi,T ]′ which is T − p × 1,
c∗i = ci(1 − θ(L)i) and f ∗ = [(1 − θ(L)i)fp+1 (1 − θ(L)i)fp+2 . . . (1 − θ(L)i)fT ]′, which
T − p× 1 with θ(L)i = (θi,1 + θi,2 + · · ·+ θi,p) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Thus, the posterior for
the factor loadings is:
λi ∼ N(λi, V i,λ) (9)
where
λi =
(
V −1λ + (σ
2
i,χ)
−1f ∗′f ∗
)−1 (
V −1λ λ+ (σ
2
i,χ)
−1f ∗′y∗i
)
and
V i,λ =
(
V −1λ + (σ
2
i,χ)
−1f ∗′f ∗
)−1
.
To estimate the VAR parameters of the factors φ1, φ2, . . . , φq we find it useful to rewrite
equation (2) as:
f = Xfφ+ ν (10)
where f = [fq+1 fq+2 . . . fT ]
′ is T − q × K, φ = [φ1 φ2 . . . φq]′ is Kq × K, ν =
[νq+1 νq+2 . . . νT ]
′ is T − q ×K and
Xf =

fq fq−1 · · ·
fq+1 fq · · ·
...
...
...
fT−1 fT−2 · · ·
f1
f2
...
fT−q

which is T − q×Kq. Thus, the posterior of the VAR parameters can be drawn from the
following distribution:
vec(Φ) ∼ N (vec(Φ¯),Σ⊗G)ISΦ ,
where Φ¯ ≡ G(Xf ′Xf )Φˆ and G = (G−1 + Xf ′Xf )−1. where ISΦ is an indicator function
enforcing stationarity.
A.2 Estimating the Latent Factors
To estimate the common latent factor we condition on the parameters of the model.5 Our
observation equation in the following state-space system is:
Y ∗t = C
∗ +HFt + χt (11)
where
H = [Λ −Θ1Λ −Θ2Λ . . . ΘpΛ 0N×K(q−p−1)]
Our state equation is:
Ft = ΦFt−1 + ν˜t (12)
5See also Kim and Nelson (1999)
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where Ft = [ft, ft−1, . . . , ft−q+1]′ is Kq × 1, which is denoted as the state vector,
ν˜t = [νt 0 . . . 0]
′ is Kq × 1 and
Φ =
[
φ1 φ2 · · ·
IK(q−1)
φq
0K(q−1)×K
]
which is Kq ×Kq. For all empirical results shown below we use q > p.
To calculate the common factor we use the algorithm suggested by Carter and Kohn
(1994) and Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (1994) . This procedure draws the vector F = [F1 F2 . . . FT ]
from its joint distribution given by:
p(F |Ξ, Y ) = p(FT |Ξ, yT )
T−1∏
t=1
p(Ft|Ft+1,Ξ, Y t) (13)
where Ξ = [Λ,Θ1, . . . ,Θp,Φ,Σ,Ωchi] and Y
t = [Y1 Y2 . . . Yt]. Because the error terms
in equations (11) and (12) are Gaussian equation (13)can be rewritten as:
p(F |Λ, Y,Ξ) = N (FT |T , PT |T )
T−1∏
t=1
N (Ft|t,Ft+1 , Pt|t,Ft+1) (14)
with
FT |T = E(FT |Λ,Ξ, Y ) (15)
PT |T = Cov(FT |Λ,Ξ, Y ) (16)
and
Ft|t,Ft+1 = E(Ft|Ft+1,Λ,Ξ, Y ) (17)
Pt|t,Ft+1 = Cov(Ft|Ft+1,Λ,Ξ, Y ) (18)
We obtain FT |T and PT |T from the last step of the Kalman filter iteration and use them
as the conditional mean and covariance matrix for the multivariate normal distribution
N (FT |T , PT |T ) to draw FT . To illustrate the Kalman Filter we work with the state-space
system equations (11) and (12). We begin with the prediction steps:
Ft|t−1 = ΦFt−1|t−1 (19)
Pt|t−1 = ΦPt−1|t−1Φ +Q (20)
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where
Q =

Σ 0 · · ·
0 0 · · ·
...
...
. . .
0 0 · · ·
0
0
...
0

which is Kq × Kq. To update these predictions we first have to derive the forecast
error:
κt = Y
∗
t − C∗ −HFt|t−1 (21)
its variance:
Σ = HPt|t−1H ′ + Ωχ (22)
and the Kalman gain:
Kt = Pt|t−1H ′Σ−1. (23)
Thus, the updating equations are:
Ft|t = Ft|t−1 +Ktκt, (24)
Pt|t = Pt|t−1 +KtHPt|t−1, (25)
To obtain draws for F1, F2, . . . , FT−1 we sample from N (Ft|t,Ft+1 , Pt|t,Ft+1), using a
backwards moving updating scheme, incorporating at time t information about Ft con-
tained in period t + 1. More precisely, we move backwards and generate Ft for t =
T − 1, . . . , p + 1 at each step while using information from the Kalman filter and Ft+1
from the previous step. We do this until p+ 1 and calculate f1, f2, . . . , fp in an one-step
procedure.
The updating equations are:
Ft|t,Ft+1 = Ft|t + Pt|tΦ
′P−1t+1|t(Ft+1 − Ft+1|t) (26)
and
Pt|t,Ft+1 = Pt|t − Pt|tΦ′P−1t+1|tΦPt|t (27)
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B Data
Series Mnemonic
1 U.S. Steel Production m01135a
2 U.S. Index of Industrial Production and Trade, Seasonally Adjusted m12004c
3 U.S. Index of Orders for Machinery Tools and Forging Machinery m06029
4 U.S. Index of Production Of Machinery, Seasonally Adjusted m01277b
5 U.S. Index of Consumer Goods m01056
6 U.S. Loans On Securities, Reporting Member Banks, Federal Reserve System m14074
7 U.S. All Other Loans, Reporting Member Banks, Federal Reserve System m14075a
8 U.S. Index of Deposit Activity m12008b
9 U.S. Bank Debits m12030
10 U.S. Clearings Index of Business m12020b
11 U.S. Commercial Paper Rate m13002
12 U.S. Discount Rates m13009
13 U.S. Ninety Day Time-Money Rates On Stock Exchange Loans m13003
14 German Orders of Machines –
15 German Steel Production –
16 German Industrial Production –
17 German Employment in Metal Trade Sector –
18 German Savings Deposits –
19 German Demand Deposits –
20 German Creditors –
21 German Stocks of Bills of Exchange –
22 German Debtors –
23 German Discount Rates –
24 German Private Discount Rates –
25 German Warenwechsel –
Source: German data are taken from Wagemann (1935). U.S. data are taken from the NBER
macro history database, www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/.
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C Figures
C.1 Latent Common Components
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Figure 1: Latent common components for the U.S. and German real, monetary and
financial variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area
90% of the posterior probability mass.
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C.2 Impulse Response Analysis (1925:9–1932:11)
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Figure 2: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard deviation
in size in the common component of U.S. real variables. The dark gray shaded area
represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 3: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the common
component of U.S. real variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the
light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 4: Responses of all variables to a contractionary nominal shock. The dark gray
shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability
mass. A sign restriction operates on the responses of the U.S. interest and banking factors
for the first six months after the shock.
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Figure 5: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary nominal shock. The
dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior
probability mass.
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Figure 6: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard deviation
in size in the U.S. monetary factor. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the
light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass. A sign restriction operates on
the responses of the U.S. real and the U.S. banking factors for the first six months after
the shock.
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Figure 7: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the common
component of U.S. interest rates. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the
light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 8: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard deviation
in size in the common component of U.S. financial variables. The dark gray shaded area
represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass. A sign
restriction operates on the responses of the U.S. real and the U.S. monetary factors for
the first six months after the shock.
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Figure 9: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the common
component of U.S. financial variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and
the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 10: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard deviation
in size in the common component of German real variables. The dark gray shaded area
represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 11: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the common
component of German real variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the
light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 12: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard deviation
in size in the common component of German monetary variables. The dark gray shaded
area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 13: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the common
component of German interest rates. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the
light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 14: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard deviation
in size in the common component of German financial variables. The dark gray shaded
area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 15: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the common
component of German financial variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and
the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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C.3 Impulse Response Analysis (1925:9 to 1931:5)
1 5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
 US Real
1 5 10 15 20
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
 US Interest
1 5 10 15 20
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
 US Banking
1 5 10 15 20
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
 D Interest
1 5 10 15 20
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
 D Banking
1 5 10 15 20
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
 D Real
Figure 16: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard deviation
in size in the common component of German monetary variables when sample period is
truncated to 1931:5. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded
area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 17: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the common
component of German monetary variables when sample period is truncated to 1931:5.
The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior
probability mass.
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Figure 18: Responses of all variables to a contractionary shock of one standard deviation
in size in the common component of German financial variables when sample period is
truncated to 1931:5. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded
area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 19: Fraction of the variance explained by a contractionary shock in the common
component of German financial variables when sample period is truncated to 1931:5.
The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior
probability mass.
42
C.4 Forecasting the Depression
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Figure 20: Forecasting the German real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and July
1931, using German real variables only. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and
the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 21: Forecasting the German real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and July
1931, using German real and banking variables. The dark gray shaded area represents
68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 22: Forecasting the German real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and July 1931,
using German real variables and interest rates. The dark gray shaded area represents 68%
and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 23: Forecasting the German real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and July
1931, using German and U.S. real variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68%
and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 24: Forecasting the German real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and July 1931,
using German real and U.S. banking variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68%
and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 25: Forecasting the German real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and July
1931, using German real and U.S. interest rates. The dark gray shaded area represents
68% and the light shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 26: Forecasting the U.S. real sector from March 1931, May 1931 and July 1931,
using U.S. real variables only. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light
shaded area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 27: Forecasting the U.S. real sector from March 1931, using U.S. real, banking,
and monetary variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded
area 90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 28: Forecasting the U.S. real sector from May 1931, using U.S. real, banking, and
monetary variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area
90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 29: Forecasting the U.S. real sector from July 1931, using U.S. real, banking, and
monetary variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area
90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 30: Forecasting the U.S. real sector from May 1931, using German banking and
monetary variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area
90% of the posterior probability mass.
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Figure 31: Forecasting the U.S. real sector from July 1931, using German banking and
monetary variables. The dark gray shaded area represents 68% and the light shaded area
90% of the posterior probability mass.
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